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3 
EU's COMMON FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS 
RUSSIA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
Vigit Canay 
INTRODUCTION 
R eviewing the past few years' literature on European Union-Russian relations, one 
observes that there is an increasing am ount of news, analysis and scholarly work, which is 
mostly produced by Westerners. Since 9/11 and perhaps even before, Russia and Russian 
politics have started to attract a significant aITlOunt of focus. Time Magaz ine even chose 
Russian President Vladimir Putin as its "Person of the Year" for 2007(Ignatius). Major news 
agencies and newspapers like Th.e Financial Times and Th.e BBC have started to devote 
distinct sections to Russia and Putin's policies so that their audiences could easily follow 
developments in Russia. H owever, unlike the Cold War era, attention directed to Russia 
seems to be largely on the European rather than the American side. 
There are two main reasons for this. First, US foreign policy is currently entangled in 
Middle Eastern politics, Iraq, M ghanistan and the fight against terrorism, which tends to 
distract attention from Russia . Second, a number of recent events, especially since 2006, have 
caused more troubles between Russia and Europe rather than between Russia and the US. 
D eteriorating British-Russian relations due to Alexander Litvinenko's death in London, 
several attempts by Ru ssia to cut the flow of natural gas to the Baltic States and Ukraine, 
the murder of journalist and pro-democratization advocate Anna Politokskaya, and debates 
about the fairness of recent elections in Russia have all contributed to the deteriorating 
relationship between Europe and Russia. As the tensions between Russia and the EU 
increase and as more people start to qu estion the impact of Putin's "authoritarian rule", the 
EU-Russian dialogue gets tougher and criticisms of EU's common policies towards Russia 
grow. SOlTle, like Edward Lucas, Central and Eastern European correspondent of The 
Economist, regards present Russian-Western relations as a " N ew Cold War"(Lucas). Others 
claim that the "EU's strategy for democratizing Russia is now officially dead" (Leonard and 
Popescu). So if West's, especially Europe's, image in international affairs is undermined by 
the emergence of a new Russian power, w hat is wrong with what Europe is doing? Is the 
Russian-European relationship doomed to become even worse? Why aren 't the conU110n 
policies of Europe working as desired? 
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To gain a better understanding of the phenomena that shapes the EU-Russian 
relations, this paper aims to bring an evaluation of EU-Russian relations by exploring its 
past and present, and giving prescriptions for positive developments. In the first section, our 
attention will be on understanding the nature of relations by focusing on the 
interdependency and the importance of geographical proximity between EU and Russia. 
Furthermore, we will try to outline what the two sides want to see in each other. The 
question we will try to answer is "what kind of EU does Russia want and vice-versa?" In 
the second section, we will be examining the topics that dominate the relationship between 
the two powers, the legal and institutional structures, and the actors that are shaping the 
relationship. Due to the variety of topics that Russian-EU relations are entangled with, we 
will focus the on the major areas of contention such as, markets and business, energy supply, 
and politics of defense and security. Our focus on these policy areas will be followed by the 
presentation and assessment of past and current legal and institutional structures that exist in 
conducting the relations regarding the topics above. By keeping an eye on present scholarly 
work, criticisms and views on the weaknesses and substance of the EU's methods in 
conducting relations with Russia will be identified. We will also touch upon the roles and 
characteristics of the actors in the making of foreign policy. In what ways is Moscow 
influencing European policies towards Russia? How does the EU's political process function 
in maintaining and conducting the relationship? Who are the responsible institutions and 
who are the influential member states or blocs? The third section will serve as a conclusion, 
and present three cOllunonly accepted strategies for the future in the market, energy and 
defense sectors that are suggested for the EU to reach the goals that are defined in its past 
common foreign policy preferences towards Russia. 
UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP 
The relationship between Russia and the EU is coined as "a strategic partnership 
founded on conmlon interests and shared values to which both sides conunitted in the 
relevant international organizations such as the UN, Council of Europe and OSCE, as well 
as with each other in the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement"(European 
Conunission 2). The values that both sides are particularly committed to are democracy, 
human rights, the rule oflaw, and principles of market economy. Before moving in to debate 
the values mentioned and their relevance to EU-Russian relations, let's look at the nature 
of the relationship. 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
The European Union 's relations with Russia are more extensive than their relations 
with any other country. The frequency of bilateral dialogue between the two is unique 
(Schuette 1). The necessity of establishing such a unique strategic partnership is easy to 
explain . Russia and the EU are incredibly interdependent on each other economicilly. 
Russia is the EU's third biggest trading partner after C hina and the United States (European 
Conmussion Directorate-General for External Relations 27). 2006 figures show that Russia 
accounted for 6.2% of EU exports and 10% of EU imports in goods. The EU25 exported 
13.1bn Euros of services to Russia, while imports of services from Russia amounted to 
9.9bn, meaning that the EU25 had a surplus of 3.2bn in trade in services with Russia (Ibid. 
30). Furthermore, in 2005 the net flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between the 
EU25 and Russia , the EU25's FDI fl ow to Russia accounted for 9bn Euros and Russia's FDI 
fl ow to the EU25 accounted for 4.1bn Euros. While assessing this economic 
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interdependency between the EU and R ussia, one sees a big increase in the level of 
economic activity from 2004 to 2006 . T he primary reason for tlus is, the EU 's expansion to 
Central and Eastern European states, put the EU in a more interdependent position with 
Russia. Most Russian investments in the fo rmer Soviet republics were included in the EU 's 
statistics after the integration of these states in to the EU single n1.arket structure. 
Secondly, when we look at the energy sector, the picture is similar. Russia is the 
world 's largest single external supplier of oil, accounting for 30% of the EU 's total imports 
and consumption. Russia also accounts for some 44% of EU 's gas imports or around 24% 
of its gas consumption. T hese figures make the EU the largest consumer of Russian energy. 
Russia exports 63% of its oil and 65% of its gas to the EU (European COITmussion 
D irectorate-General for External R elations 13). In summary, as explained by the EU Energy 
COITllll.issioner Andris Piebalgs, " In the energy sector, Russia needs Europe as much as 
Europe needs Russia. T he energy that Europe buys from Russia has been one of the key 
factors in Russia's econonuc revival and stable fl ows of reasonably priced energy has been 
an important motor for Europe's econonuc growth"(Aslund). All in all, the EU depends on 
Russia because Russia is a vital market for EU's export of goods, services and capital. 
Therefore, a growing Russian economy and nliddle-c1ass are necessary for European 
markets to do business with Russia and increase European profits. O n the other hand, Russia 
relies on the EU because the Russian economy needs European expertise and technology 
to modernize its economy and become more competitive. T he EU is Russia's biggest 
recipient of energy products, and the EU 's econonuc and industrial development is essential 
for Russia to sell its gas and oil . Metal and energy exports account for 20% of the Russian 
GOP. Without a strong market like the EU, nearby and dependent on energy, Russia would 
have trouble financing its own development. 
EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES IN RUSSIA 
By keeping an eye on the nature of the interdependent relationship explained above, 
let us try to explain what Russia and the EU want from each o ther. What kind of Russia 
does EU want to see? In the econonuc sense, the EU wants to see a m odernized Russian 
economy integrated into the world economy. Since N ovember 2002, the EU has recognized 
Russia as a "market economy" and supports her accession to the World Trade Organization 
(Aslund). T he EU 's efforts to modernize the Russian economy are based on key concepts 
such as increasing transparency in business and improving the conurutment of Russia's 
business and state elite to legali ty and the rule of law. Asswrung that a developing Russian 
economy would attract more European investment and promote Russian ties with the 
European Single M arket, the EU wants to secure its econolruc interests in Russia by 
convincing Russians to follow the EU's advice to create a secure and stable business 
environment for econonuc growth . A more predictable Russian economy is seen as 
insurance for increasing the willingness of European investors to invest both in Russia and 
its former areas of influence (i .e. Central Asian, and Central and Eastern European states) . 
To complete her efforts to modernize the Russian economy and create a stable path 
for the development of European and Russia business and energy sectors, the EU also 
defines an ideal Russia as cOITlllutted to the " COI1.U11.0n values". The European Union 's 
strategy towards Russia underlines the importance of values to the EU. These values, the 
principles that the EU is founded upon, are: liberty, dem ocracy, respect for human rights, 
fu ndamental freedoms and the rule of law (Schuette 27) . T he EU wants a Russia where 
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economic growth and middle class development would be accompanied by political 
freedoms, understanding of democracy and respect for laws, so that the growing liberal 
economic structure would follow the democratization process that Europe followed. In the 
EU's belief, the democratization of Russia would prevent Post-Soviet Russia from 
resonating the characteristics of the authoritarian capitalist regimes of the past, such as 
Hitler 's Germany and Mussolini 's Italy. Finally, despite the EU's enlargement to the Baltic 
R epublics and its surrounding of the Kaliningrad enclave, as described in the words of EU 
Conunissioner G i.inter Verheugen, " the EU is fa irly conurutted not to allow new dividing 
lines to be drawn in Europe"(Lynch 101). A critique of why the EU cannot achieve her 
demands listed above will be attempted after we examine the institutional and the legal 
framework that the EU utilizes to maintain her relations with Russia. 
RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE 
As Edward Lucas and Ian Brenuner describe in detail , the failed econOiruc and social 
policies of the Yeltsin era changed the Russian perception of Western assistance in aiding 
Post-Soviet Russia. The "Shock Therapy" method of transforming the col1Unand economy 
to a capitalist one was not as successful as it was in the CEE and brought about an extreme 
fo rm of limitless capitalism in Russia (Brenm1er 126). The rise of " oligarchs" and their elitist 
rule of the Russian economic and political life further alienated the Russian public from 
both Boris Yeltsin's liberal agenda and Western business support behind it. The 1998 crash of 
the Russian finance sector created chaos in the economy by causing high levels of inflation 
together wit a loss of confidence in the market(Lucas 31-33). Understanding the Russian 
experience of the 1990s is important in order to understand the present Russian rule of 
Putin and his like-minded ex-KGB, pro-centralization and pro-authoritarian staff, which is 
also called "siloviki" (Illiarionov). H owever, since that requires a detailed study, let us focus 
on the Russian view of the EU in the context of Putin's rise to power and today's Russian 
policies. 
The Russias' self perception and their perception of their relationship with the EU 
can be understood by reading the "M edium-Term Strategy for D evelopment of Relations 
between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)" , a document 
written in 1999 and presented to the EU C onmussion in Brussels by Prime Minister Putin, 
as a response to the "Col1Unon Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on 
Russia" (Lynch 103) .1 In its first page, while describing the differences between Russia and 
the E U, it says: "During the period under review, partnership between Russia and the 
European Union will be based on the treaty relations, i .e. without an officially stated 
objective of Russia 's accession to or "association" with the EO. As a world power situated 
on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to deternune and implement its 
domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of an Euro-Asian state and the largest 
country of the C IS, independence of its position and activities at international organizations. 
From this point of view, partnership with the EU can manifest itself in j oint effo rts to 
establish an effective systepl of collective security in Europe on the basis of equality without 
dividing lines, including through the development and implementation of the C harter on 
European Security, in progress towards the creation of the Russia - European Union free 
trade zone, as well as in a high level of mutual confidence and cooperation in politics and 
economy".2 
Based on this official statement contained in a legal document, Russia certainly sees 
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itself as a global player, w hich is diffe rent from other former Soviet republics that seek 
accession to the EU. Russia 's self-understanding shows that EU 's efforts to persuade Russia 
to democratize itself as a Western country and modernize its economy as the prospective 
E U member states were doing is not so useful since Russia is not abided by any EU 
accession criteria. The EU certainly cannot sanction anything to influence the internal 
affairs of Russia and cannot obtain any concrete promise from the Kremlin with in regard 
to bringing changes to the Russian political structure. Aware of these fac ts, Putin 's Russia 
wants an EU that doesn't interfere in Russian internal affairs. In issues like political 
freedoms, the rule of law and the power of the judiciary or the C hechen Confl..ict, Russia 
wants the EU to be silent. In the economic sense, R ussia wants to further increase her 
integration with Europe, however by playing the economic game on her own terms. U nder 
Putin's rule, Russia has certainly diminished the economic dominance of the oligarchs, 
allocating their economic power to the central authority by creating giant state-owned 
fi rm s. Centralization has become the dominant phenomenon in Russian economic 
development and has brought stability to the market by decreasing the influence of free-
lancing business elites that had the potential to challenge Putin 's authority. The 
Khodorovsky affair is a clear example of that (Lucas 48). Today, Russia wants an economic 
integration with Europe w hich would benefit Russia by helping to modernize her 
economy by attracting investments but also tolerating the operation of Russian centralized 
giants like the energy firm Gazprom to operate in the EU market . 
Furthermore, Russia wants a Europe, which is more transparent w hile forming 
conunon policies that are related to Russia. Europe should allow Russia to become more 
involved in the European decision-making process on questions that affect Russia's interests, 
such as trade policy, anti-dumping regulations, and the precise impact of enlargement on 
Russian goods that are exported to the new member states (Lynch 104). 
In issues like security policies and the role of European Security and D efense Policy 
and Conm10n Foreign Security Policy in EU-Russian relations, Russia looks favorably to 
the development of both. Until NATO 's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, Russia supported the 
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a lever to undermi ne the 
supremacy of NATO, which doesn't intend on granting Russia membership. Mter the 1999 
NATO intervention, Russia realized that O SCE's importance, as a security organization was 
not enough for Russia to gain more influence in European defense politics. Therefore, 
Russia started to perceive ESDP and C FSP as initiatives that could allocate some of the 
power and influence of European security policies to a purely European level by eliminating 
the domi nance of the U S. Russia wants an EU where Europeans assume more responsibility 
in forming their security policies by diminishing American influence, because Russia is 
aware of the fact that, it can influence the European decision-making since the EU and 
Russia are more interdependent to each other in economic terms than U S and 
Russia(Lynch 107). Today, despite ESDP's perception as a mechanism to dilute NATO's 
predominant role by providing an alternative locus for decision-making, increasing dialogue 
between Russia and NAT O is making the assessment of Russian views on European 
security policy structure harder to make. 
EU-RuSSIAN RELATIONS: TOPICS, ACTORS, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
In the second section, this paper will summarize the topics, and the substance and 
structure of the current legal framework and institutional arrangem.ents that dominate the 
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EU 's policy towards Russia. It w ill also examine the different foreign policy making 
structures and actors on both sides. T he conclusion w ill include a critique and evaluation of 
the current structure. 
TOPICS 
Broad topics that dominate the legal documents signed by the EU and/ or Russia are 
mostly focused on 1) trade and economic cooperation , 2) energy, climate change and the 
environment, 3) freedom , security, justice and human rights, 4) foreign policy cooperation 
and external security, 5) research , education and culture. These are the broad policy areas 
where, European and Russian jo int and unilateral initiatives try to come up with policies 
for better integration of each bloc. There are also specific cooperation initiatives both from 
EU and Russia that try to address the relations of the two in specifi c Russian regions such 
as the Kaliningrad enclave and N orthern Caucuses (European Commission Directorate-
General for External R elations) . R eturning back to the topics listed above, it can be said 
that in areas like climate change, environmental regulations, research, education and cultural 
exchanges there is more cooperation between the two since more tangible results are visible. 
In terms of regional politics, cooperation between the EU and Russia in setting regulations 
for the free-passage of goods and people from Russia to Kaliningrad , which is surrounded 
by EU -member Baltic states since the 2004 EU expansion, seems to be more fruitful 
compared to the lack of common understanding between the EU and Russia in adopting 
conunon policies towards the N orthern Caucuses. What are the " real" issues that dominate 
the EU-Russian relations? 
Clearly, the weight of issues like energy security, market integration and structure, 
cooperation in defense, and the EU's emphasis on internal political developments in Russia , 
are much more dominant compared to other topics. M ajor contentions and conflict of 
interests occur in the debates about these issues, and the dominant literature regarding EU-
Russian relations focuses on these aspects of the relationship since they are more 
problematic and need more urgent solutions. T he political sensitivity of both sides to 
developments and policies in the energy sector, market regulations or political freedoms in 
Russia, affects the language of legal documents. In general, the wording of the clauses 
adopted by between the EU and Russia is soft and weak compared to the unilateral official 
statements. Therefore, while evaluating the current legal structures and actors responsible for 
conducting the relationship, we will focus on issues like energy, market and defense. 
ACTORS AND METHODS 
Actors and methods in foreign policy-making are largely different in the EU and 
Russia. Russia, which has under gone an increased centralization in the Putin era , depends 
mostly on the central govermnent 's views and perceptions in foreign policy-making. 
Members of the new political elite, who occupy strong positions in the executive boards of 
the state owned giant companies, are responsible fo r Russia's foreign policy decisions 
regarding the markets, security and energy. As Dimitri Trenin explains, the consolidation of 
the control of money in fewer hands has made the elite stronger in easily utilizing the power 
of capital to increase its business interests. The unofficial slogan has now become "What is 
good for Gazprom is good for Russia" (Trenin 95). As this new "bureaucratic capitalist" class 
has gained more confidence, it has become reluctant to share the power of decision making 
with the opposition groups and the responsiveness of the state has declined. 
The new elite's main method of dealing with the EU is "divide and rule". Due to a 
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broad lack of the weak level of conun on policy understanding at the European level , Russia 
capitalizes on EU's internal divisions by preferring to deal with EU member-states 
separately rather than facing them as a group. Especially in the energy sector, Russia feels 
confident in sealing bilateral energy deals with countries with higher levels of Russian gas-
dependency like France and Germany and plays them against the Russia-skeptics hke 
Poland and the Baltic States (Trenin 98). Furthermore, "desperate for energy access and 
profits it brings, European energy companies are played against each other by the Kremlin 
in o rder to secure more advantageous conditions for Russia" (Baran 133) . As a result, 
Russia's record on the adoption of European common values has become less questioned as 
pragmatic economic interests dominate the political agenda. 
Unlike heavily presidential and business-oriented foreign pohcy making in Russia, in 
the EU decision-making is a complex process. "Dispersal of the decision-making power 
among different institutions affects the EU's ability to interact strategically with Moscow. 
EU is something with divided institutions, unclear sovereignty, a weak sense of conmlon 
interests, and few institutions in political arena that are independently to achieve the EU's 
declared ends" (Lynch 11 2). Different from Russia's emphasis on sovereignty, the EU's 
emphasis is on unity of views on "conunon values" . A conmlon policy towards Russia over 
a longer term is harder for the EU as change in the institutions running the EU (i.e. Council 
of Ministers, European Council and EU Presidency) is more frequent compared with the 
corresponding Russian institutions. M ost of the time, EU business interests shows a 
preference for short- term stability in EU-Russian affairs and that diminishes the political 
will of the EU leaders in bringing a more substantive and radical change to the nature of 
the relationship. Finally, in the crowded EU 27, the divided perceptions and views of Russia 
make it even harder for EU sunmuts to produce genuine solutions or proposals to more 
effectively deal w ith Russia. For example, while states like Germany, which badly need 
energy, want to utilize less provocative methods against Russia, others like " the Russia-
skeptics" (i.e., Britain, the Czech R epublic) and " the N ew Cold Warriors" (i .e., Poland and 
Lithuania) are reluctant to continue the relationship with Russia in its current form, which 
undernunes the EU's power (Leonard and Popescu 2). 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: A COMPLEX AND GROWING STRUCTURE 
T he legal and institutional framework of the EU-Russian relations started with the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that was signed in 1994 and came in to 
fo rce in 1997 w ith an initial duration of 10 years. The PCA aimed to bring about 
cooperation of the two in various topics including the major ones listed above. It established 
the following institutional arrangements to reach its goals: 1) EU-Russia slllmmts, where the 
Russian President and the EU troika meet twice a year; 2) Permanent Partnership Council 
(PPC), aimed to allow Ministers (i.e. Ministers of energy, foreign affairs, enviromnent) 
responsible for various policy areas to meet as often as necessary to deal with specific issues 
discussed at the sumnut meetings; 3) Cooperation Conmuttee in which EU Conmu ssion 
and senior-level Russian officials meet; 4) The Parliamentary Cooperation Conmuttee, 
which aims to increase the exchange of views between MPs. Political dialogue between 
Russia and the EU also takes place in the format of contacts between the Russian 
diplomatic Imssion in Brussels and EU officials, and expert meetings in C FSP formations 
(Schuette 2). 
The second legal document was the " C onunon Strategy on Russia" (CS), adopted by 
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the EU in 1999 and expired in 2004. Although a unilateral document, it was public and 
aimed to increase the coherence of foreign policy understanding towards Russia among the 
EU member states. As a response to CS, as previously mentioned above, Russia formed its 
"Russian Mediul1l-Term Strategy on EU Relations" in 1999 for duration of 10 years. With 
the maturation of the three pillars of the EU as well as the EU-Russian relationship, EU-
Russian relations started to categorized as "Common Spaces" as explained in the "Four 
Conmlon Spaces for EU and Russia".3 This structure was adopted in 2003 in the St. 
Petersburg EU-Russia Sunurut. In 2005, the roadmaps to implement the short and medium 
term goals of the "Conullon Spaces" were adopted. The Conunon Spaces are : 1) The 
Conunon Economic Space; 2) The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice ; 3) The 
Common Space of External Security; and 4) The Conul1on Space of Research and 
Education, including Cultural Aspects. 
Although there area a lots of technical details regarding the " Conmlon Spaces" and 
the areas they address, a number of significant points are notable. First, although Germany 
and France introduced "Conunon Spaces" , the Conmussion and the Council Secretariat, 
rather than the individual member states, has done most of the substantial work(Schuette 4). 
Second, major econOiruc aims are the diversification of Russia 's non-energy related exports 
to Europe as well as securing Europe's energy supply by creating an environment of 
confidence and fair relations with the Russian energy sector. In the political field , the EU 
has pursued two types of dialoglJe with Russia : international issues, including regional 
conflicts; and Russian internal affairs and Russia conurutment to the "conml0n European 
values". In the former, the EU found that it is easier to come to tenns with Russia in 
addressing international issues like nuclear proliferation or the fight against terrorism. 
However, in the issues directly involving Russia such as political freedoms in the country or 
regional conflicts in the territories of the Federation, the EU realized that it is harder to 
engage Russia. Furthermore, regarding the issues related with the former areas of Russian 
influence in Europe, the EU has seen that by engaging Russia in an intensive dialogue in 
the framework of ESOp, the EU could achieve what it wanted without an increase in 
Russian aggressiveness (Schuette 7-9). In the "Conunon Space on Security and Home 
Affairs", the EU again found a Russia which is reluctant to cooperate and agree with the 
EU in the adoption of common values of freedom such as: independent media, human 
rights, the role of civil society and democracy. However, in the issues related with justice and 
security affairs, the EU cooperated with Russia in a majority of areas like, the fight against 
illegal activities, migration, money laundering, trafficking of drugs and humans and 
organized crime. 
As observed above, perhaps the most severe problem in the Russian-EU relationship 
is getting Russian conurutment to the values of the EU in an honest way. The EU wants to 
see some practical evidence in Russian political life regarding its development as a pro-
democratic liberal regime. However, despite EU's repetition of the concept of" conunon 
values" in every occasion, there is little progress on the Russian side. Certainly, the soaring 
oil and gas prices and the Russian econOiruc revival beginning in 2000s have encouraged 
Kremlin to create an alternative to the democratic liberal capitalist model pursued by the 
West. This new " illiberal capitalism" adopted new approaches for understanding the role of 
sovereignty, state power and central authority in the development of markets (Raclunan). 
However, despite the growing confidence of Russian politicians in their financial and 
econonuc development, there was a problem in the EU's conunon foreign policy-making 
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system as well that did not help the EU to achieve her aims. 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZED RELATIONSHIP: A CRITIQUE 
Rolf Schuette, a senior German diplomat specialized in Russian affairs, is someone 
who presents a comprehensive account of what the EU did wrong while integrating 
"conullon values" to its foreign policy-making and why the desired level of effectiveness in 
influencing Russia couldn't be achieved by the EU First, PCAs, which were initially 
adopted by Russia and later on by other former Soviet Republics, differed significantly in 
wording. The EU used a more effective language in convincing the CEE countries to 
embrace the "conunon values of Europe". Furthennore, to increase their compliance with 
the EU's advice and policy directions, the EU promised the CEE states membership in the 
EU. However, "even if only a partner, Russia was expected to become like a Western 
European democracy, without being offered the prospect of full-fledged membership of the 
family of Western European democracies" (Schuette 15). Second, the CS was a document 
that aimed to "test the efficiency of the new EU mechanisms in developing and activating 
a new CFSP instrument. As such, the contents of the CS were not the primary focus" 
(Schuette 16). Since it was a unilateral docmnent and since its content was not something 
planned, but something that combined specific ideas that member states came up with, it 
failed to get Russia to abide by it. Furthermore, it failed to become a blueprint that can be 
used by member states in formulating their national foreign policies towards Russia, since 
its conclusions lacked the unified political will of all European leaders. 
Third, the unilateral adoption of the CS encouraged the Russian leadership to adopt 
the MTS in a similar way. The MTS, a document that came as a response to the CS, 
challenged Europe's vision of Russia by using an opposite approach and language. Russia 
now showed the fundamental difference between herself and the EU by not placing any 
significant emphasis on human rights or democracy in the document. Russia answered the 
question of "what the partnership should be based upon?" While the EU was pushing 
forward for the incorporation of "common values" in the EU-Russian agenda, Russia 
declared that she was not seeking EU membership, and therefore, her political system did 
not have to be the same as other EU member states (Schuette 18). Fourth, the results, 
language and significance of joint statements of sUIllinit meetings usually vary due to the 
different political agenda and envirorunent surrounding them. Therefore, it is hard to 
describe the outcomes of sununits as a general achievement for increasing the EU-Russian 
relations. However, it is true that the high-level nature of meetings made them beneficial for 
parties to understand each other's demands by getting into face-to-face dialogue. 
Finally, few documents were produced in 2004 the year EU expansion dominated the 
political agenda of the EU-Russian relations (European Conunission) . EU Conunission 
published a conununication to be delivered to The General Affairs and External Relations 
Council of EU (GAC) and EU Parliament. The Conullission's conununication measured 
the assessment of EU-Russian relations and its content was adopted by the GAC that 
followed. Later on, after the 13th EU-Russia Sununit, both parties published a "Joint 
Statement on E.U. Enlargement and E.U.- Russian Relations".4 As, Schuette notes down, 
the significant thing about both documents is, they didn't significantly include the conunon 
European values, or any strong reference to previous legal agreements. Rather than 
formulating its hopes and demands toward Russia as a precondition for developing the 
strategic partnership, EU started to perceive the partnership as a mean to achieve the goals 
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and adoption of common values (Schuette 22-24). Perhaps due to the sensitive political 
environment that expansion created or perhaps due to problematic EU-US relations and the 
EU's failed attempt to derive a common foreign policy due to Iraq War, the EU seemed to 
lack the confidence she earlier had in using a powerful language against Russia. 
All in all, to close tlus debate about common values and their relevance to EU's 
conunon foreign policy towards Russia, it can be said that, in the context of dense and 
complex structure of legal and institutional framework , which tries to address a growing 
number of issues everyday, it is hard for the EU to come up with a clear strategy to make 
Russia to conunit itself to all of the European values embraced by an ideal Western 
democracy. Therefore, before continuing this same strategy, which obviously not effective 
enough to make Russia more responsive to European demands by keeping an eye on the 
recent developments just took place during the last parliamentary and presidential elections, 
EU should come up with a preference of strategies that she has to follow to change the 
image of EU in the relationship as the weak partner against the authoritarian and powerful 
Russia. 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? : CONCLUSION AND SOME ADVICE 
Synthesizing what is presented and argued above, there are three fundamental 
problems in EU's conunon foreign policy towards Russia. First, in business, despite EU-
Russian business interests are beconung more and more interdependent, lack of a single 
voice in wording the EU's conunon business interests vis-a-vis growing power of Russian 
state owned giants is causing EU's market policies regarding Russia to be unpredictable. The 
EU wants to set up regulations regarding the market and create a more stable economic 
environment by trying to influence Russia to change its understanding of internal politics, 
ill the light of European C01111110n values. However, EU's long term ideals about Russia fails 
to bring short-term benefits and that creates more confidence in Russian side while 
adopting her " illiberal capitalist" approach to European markets. A sensible short-term goal 
for the EU should be, as noted above in the arguments made at in the end of legal an 
institutional framework section, choosing the preferred conml0n values that EU wants 
Russia to apply inunediately to increase the level of confidence in the relationship. That 
preferred value should be " rule oflaw" (Leonard and Popescu 3). Although EU's long-term 
goal should be promotion of a liberal democracy in Russia , EU has to focus on the 
application of rule of law in the first place to prevent the complete failure of the aims 
outlined in the past legal documents, which are largely not applied . Rule oflaw, would bring 
both reliability to business and political relations between the two group. 
Second, in the energy sector, being highly dependent on Russian energy supply 
undernunes Europe's efforts to foster the ideals of pro-democratic good governance 
envisaged in CFSP Member states became far more reluctant to cede sovereignty to Brussels 
on energy policy since they want to secure their energy supplies from Russian by making 
bi-Iateral deals (Baran 140). Therefore to solve this problem, the EU's strategy of decreasing 
the Russian impact on energy could follow a sin1ilar one proposed by Baran. On the focus 
of EU's strategy there should be two aims: 1) diversifying the EU's energy resources and 2) 
ainung to reach alternative oil and gas suppliers. Despite Russia's efforts to increase the 
number of pipelines that will transport Russian oil and gas to the heart of EU (i.e. North-
Stream and South-Stream Projects) , the EU should seek alternative pipeline routes to 
connect European energy market to Caspian oil and gas resources (The Econonust) . That 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/5
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 33 
strategy should also include, increasing the EU's efforts to engage in more diplomatic and 
business relations with the Central Asian resource rich republics, whose energy markets are 
currently dominated by Russia. Furthermore, if the EU wants to act in her current legal 
framework to deal with the Russian energy giants and their unfavorable business activities, 
the EU should not fear from using her antitrust policies to prosecute the monopolistic 
structures of these firms to regulate their behavior in the EU market (Baran 140) . If 
sanctioning the giant German and French energy companies yield positive results, 
Conunission can use the antitrust regulations against the Russian finns as well. This kind of 
approach will also further strengthen the EU's firmness in showing the importance of the 
rule of law to Russia. 
Third problem is in the area of defense. Although there are lots of promises in the legal 
documents to improve the common understandings of Russia and the EU regarding the 
ESDP and CFSP initiatives, there is a lack of practical results. Both sides promise to 
cooperate in the international defense sector however; there is no joint security force in the 
ground that consists of both Europeans and Russians. The solution can be, as Dov Lynch 
explains, forming a joint security and conflict settlement initiative in Moldova's problematic 
Ukrainian border zone (Transdniestria), where separatist movements undermine the 
political stability of the region. Sharing responsibility and conull.itment in fonning a joint 
structure in conflict management and temporary constitutional settlements, Russia and EU 
could show an effort under the context of ESDP and OSCE (Lynch 116) . That kind of 
strategy would make Russia to feel like, she is able to be a part of European defense and 
security initiatives if she starts participating to cooperate with Europe better than before. 
Placing a modest whose strategic force which's resources and personnel supplied by both 
Russia and the EU on Moldova, would help the EU in the future to engage Russia in 
bringing clarification and solutions to conunon foreign policy views on the future of states 
like Georgia, Ukraine and the rest of Balkans. 
END NOTES 
1. Official document of Conunon Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on 
Russia can be accessed at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relationsl ceecal com_strati russia_99 .pdf> 
2. An unofficial English translation of Medium-Term Strategy for Development of 
Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010) 
can be accessed at European Commission web portal at 
<http://ec.europa .eul external_relations I russia I russian_medium_term_strategy I> 
3. The detailed framework of the Four ConmlOn Spaces for EU and Russia was outlined 
in the EU-Russia Summit in The Hague in 25 November and a copy of that 
framework could be reached through EU Conunission's web portal at 
< http: //ec.europa.eu/externaLrelations/ russia /sununic11_04/ m04_268.htm> . 
4. "Joint Statement on E .U. Enlargement and E.U.- Russian Relations" was published in 
27/0312004 can be accessed through 
<http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relationsl russia I russia_docs/js_elar~270404 .hun> 
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